The issue of institutional support for innovations in Latin American countries has been examined in this paper. We use aprirori theoretical knowledge on this issue in order to derive one econometric model out of a theoretical framework. The influence on human capital variable on innovations growth it is straightforward. However, the sign on the institutions variable is ambiguous. Defective institutions in Latin American countries resulted in regional's social conflicts which were severe, and the ability of social groups to use formal political institutions to resolve, or mitigate this conflicts has been much less effective. The lack of democracy if we may say, deteriorates the entrepreneurial spirit and hence institutions may as well turn not to be supportive of innovations.
Introduction
In this paper the issue of institutions support for innovations has been investigated on the panel of Latin American countries. In the macroeconomic literature there has been consensus made, that the long run growth is product primary of innovations. The economists are still trying to set up a standard theoretical framework for long run economic growth that will incorporate institutions and innovations, Sala-i-Martin, However, in this models institutions are taken as given, and there is little or no attempt in this models to explain what besides labor and capital, and knowledge accumulation drives innovation. However, Barro (1997) 6 , stated and found that political and economic institutions are some of the most important factors in explaining differences in growth per capita. Unlike neoclassical economist, institutional economist tend to focus on institutions more. The influence of a institutions on the ability of one country to advance technologies is a central way that institutions affect economic performance.
However, institutional economist have much more to do in order to include technology and technological change explicitly in their change, Nelson, Nelson(2002) 7 .According to this two authors , Nelson et Nelson (2002) , institutions are so called "social technologies", this is in line with Thorsten Veblen's view of institutions as "general habits of action and thought". Now, from our pint of vie we show in the Table 1 , with what percentage does technological diffusing products enter in the import of Latin American countries. 6 Barro, Robert,(1997) , Determinants of economic growth: A cross-country empirical study. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. 7 Nelson,R., Nelson As it can be seen from the Table Latin American countries are big importers of technical progress diffusing products, and that throughout time that trend is positive and the import of technology increase.
Countries in the 
From theoretical to econometric model:

Institutional changes in the function of innovation
The model is developed from Tebaldi and Elmsli (2008) 9 , suggests that technology is related with organization and the quality of institutions. 
The solution of the previous expression if
, is given by the following expression:
The result from the previous differential equation can be simplified : 
An alternative form of expression
If you integrate the indefinite integral we get:
According to the expression In order, previous econometric equation to estimate can logarithm from both sides: property requires the owner has the benefit drawn from these rights to be greater than the cost of excluding others from this property. When the cost of the property is high the ownership will be joint. According to Nelson (2002) , the idea of innovation systems is an institutional concept par excellence .The idea that institutions have a central role in innovations system is leading in theorists of the idea for National innovation system (NIS). Such as Edquist and Johnson (1997) 14 , are defining that Nelson, Nelson (2002) . 15 The social technologies still seen as generally accepted ways of managing, Williamson (1985). 16 Usually, in literature for transaction costs, social technology provide a way for something to do with low transaction costs. 
Here in the former case, the function C is increasing and convex.
Because taxes are the only government revenue, the budget constraint is given as:
Tax rate they prefer poor is given as:
While the elite can avoid taxation and its normal point of being it is
Individual utility is defined as the discounted value of income after taxation.
In the previous expression t  represents the discount factor, while
it is a tax after tax. In undemocratic environment policy govern agents who belong to the elite.
The only impact on the poor is through de facto power revolution that is undeniable. If the revolution didn't happen
Or the previous expression means that the total utility of agents is equal to the sum of the discounted value of the tax after tax, meaning that the remaining portion of consumption with total revenues of taxes then remain to fund government spending. If there is a revolution it will succeed but part of the productive capacity of the economy, which help to produce new innovative products are forever destroyed. People after the revolution has taken all produced production so far, and the part  which every citizen gets to him after the revolution is given by the following expression:
The total revenue in the economy is given by the expression  y   1
, and it is divided 
4.Descriptive statistics of the model
Next, what follows is the panel descriptive statistics of the three variables that are being used in the model. In the econometric part we use following equation:
In the previous equation From the above table can be seen that the three series in the six panels are stationary, i.e. they move around mean zero and they all have some variance.
5.Econometric estimation and results
In 
In Equation (25) is also proven graphically on the following chart.
Figure 3 Marginal contribution of ODA to technological growth
But from the previous figure we can see that the overall marginal coefficient on the quality of institutions is negative, that means that overall contribution to innovations growth is negative. Coefficient of the determination is 15%. So, we have ambiguous relationship between quality of institutions and technological growth based on our results for the sample of Latin American countries. 
Conclusion
